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NOTES AND COMMENTS
LISTENERS' RIGHTS: PUBLIC INTERVENTION IN
RADIO FORMAT CHANGES
INTRODUCTION

The rise of administrative agencies' has been identified as "the
most significant legal trend of the last century. ' 2 Their policies and decisions can have more impact on public values and interests than do
those of the courts. It is not surprising, therefore, that these powerful
regulatory bodies have been subjected to serious criticism throughout
their history.3 Since the 1960's, much of this criticism has focused on
the area of consumer protection. Dissatisfaction with the agencies'
unresponsiveness to public needs and interests has led to demands for
citizen participation in the administrative process.4 In part as a result

I Although some delegations of administrative power date back to the time of the
Constitution, see, e.g., Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. XXIV, I Stat. 95 (payment of military
pensions); Act of July 31, 1789 ch. V, 1 Stat. 29 (regulation of the collection of duties on
imports), the real proliferation of administrative agencies occurred in the 1930's. See, e.g.,
Act of July 5, 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (National Labor Relations Board); Act of June 6,
1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (Securities and Exchange Commission).
2 FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 348 U.S. 470, 487 (1952). See generally 1 K. DAVIs, ADINISTRATvE LAw TREATISE § 1.02 (1958) [hereinafter cited as DAvis].
3 Early criticism stemmed from the delegation doctrine, a constitutional barrier ques-

tioning the legitimacy of granting legislative power to an administrative agency. See A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Refining Co. v.
Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). During the 1940's and 1950's the focus shifted, and the agencies
were scrutinized and attacked upon considerations of procedural due process and protection for individuals against agencies' infringement of personal rights. The highlight of
efforts to make procedures uniform and fair to those affected by agency action was the
enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of June 11, 1946, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 327). More recently, the Commission
has been accused of pro-industry bias. See note 4 infra.
The sources of agency criticism have been diverse, ranging from the public and the
regulated industries to the three branches of government. See generally K. DAvis, DLcRETIONARY JUSrICE (1969); H. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINIsrRATIVE AGENCIES (1962).

4The agency is theoretically the public's representative since it is charged with
regulating in the public interest. Without any audience before the agency, the public
began to feel that the agencies were becoming industry oriented. These charges did not
necessarily imply corruption. The fact was that the agencies were listening only to the
complaints of the industries and becoming sympathetic to their ideas.
Charges of pro-industry bias have come from higher levels. See 116 CONG. REC. 10,246
(1970) (remarks of Senator Proxmire). "[A]gendes, originally established to protect the
public interest, have been captured by the very interests they were established to regulate."
Id. Similar allegations have even been brought from within the ranks. See Renewals of
Broadcast Licenses for Ark., La. & Miss., 42 F.C.C.2d 1, 3 (1973) (Comm'r Johnson, dissenting). "Whatever may be the case elsewhere, however, the Federal Communications
Commission is a classic case of what now Chief Justice Burger once called 'a curious
neutrality in favor of the licensee."' Id. at 6, citing Office of Communication of the United
Church of Christ v. FCC, 425 F.2d 543, 547 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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of these protests the somewhat rigid concept of standing has been relaxed, providing the public with more ready access to the regulatory
processes of the agencies and a voice in the formulation of agency
policies. Such public involvement is not only valuable but perhaps
indispensible in securing adequate representation of consumer interests. 6
Increased public participation, stemming from the liberalization
of standing requirements in a 1966 landmark decision, is highlighted
by recent cases in the communications field.7 The courts had traditionally maintained that only those alleging the invasion of a legally
protected interest or direct and substantial injury should be granted
standing before administrative agencies. When found to have a potentially adverse effect upon the public interest, economic injury9 and
5 Under the early test, standing in administrative actions was granted to one who

could allege "the invasion of some legal or equitable right." Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes,
202 US. 464, 483 (1938), quoting New Orleans, M. & Tex. R.R. v. Ellerman, 105 US. 166,
174 (1881). This "legal interest test" remained the sole basis for granting standing until the

idea emerged that a statute could confer standing upon non-official persons as "private
Attorney Generals [sic]." Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir.), vacated as

moot, 320 US. 707 (1943) (per curiam). It was not until 1966 that non-economic injury
was recognized as a basis for standing in Office of Communication of the United Church
of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966). See notes 13-16 and accompanying text

infra. A more liberal standing test was finally enunciated by the Supreme Court in Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 US. 150 (1970). Under this test,
the plaintiff must allege "injury in fact economic or otherwise" and an "interest sought
to be protected ... arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by
the statute or constitutional guarantee in question." Id. at 152-53; accord, Barlow v.
Collins, 397 US. 159 (1970). See generally DAvis, supra note 2, at §§ 22.00 et seq. (Supp.
1970). For a recent discussion of standing to intervene and standing to seek judicial
review of agency action see Note, Selection of Administrative Intervenors: A Reappraisal
of the Standing Dilemma, 42 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 991 (1974).
6 The revelations surrounding Watergate have only dramatized what many concerned citizens and public interest lawyers have known for a long time: we cannot
rely on government to solve our problems. The regulatory agencies set up to serve
the public interest all too often end up almost totally subservient to industry pressure.
Seemingly congenital pro-industry bias, of course, is no reason to give up on
the agency. Quite the contrary. It must be watched all the more closely. There
must be appeals to the courts,] . . . Congressional and press exposes of the FCC's
most egregious decisions.... [and] public participation.
Renewals of Broadcast Licenses for Ark., La. & Miss., 42 F.C.C.2d 1, 6 (1973) (Comm'r
Johnson, dissenting).
7 See notes 108-40 and accompanying text infra.
8 See note 5 supra.
OSee FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 US. 470, rehearingdenied, 309 US. 642
(1940). Sanders Brothers had challenged the application of another broadcaster for a construction permit to erect a new station in the former's city of license. When the Commission granted the application, the licensee sought rehearing of the decision on the issue
of alleged economic injury to its station. Rehearing was denied and Sanders Brothers successfully appealed to the D.C. Circuit. In reversing the decision of the court of appeals,
the Supreme Court recognized that while "it is not the purpose of the [Communications]
Act to protect a licensee against competition," id. at 475, the question of competition is not
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electrical interference' 0 were, on this theory, recognized as grounds for
standing to be heard. When a listeners group, however, asserting the
public's interest in receiving balanced programming of important
public issues, petitioned to have a television station's license renewal
application denied," the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) held that the petitioners had no standing "purely as members
of the general public."'12 The United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit reversed this restrictive interpretation of
the standing doctrine and held in Office of Communication of the
United Church of Christ v. FCC'3 that the Commission must allow
"responsible representatives of the listening public" an opportunity
to be heard.' 4 Speaking for a unanimous court, Judge, now Chief
Justice, Burger criticized the Commission's rejection of effective public
participation, 5 for "experience demonstrates consumers are generally
among the best vindicators of the public interest."' 1 Manifesting an
awareness that broadcaster responsiveness to the public requires active
citizen participation, numerous community groups and listener orga7
nizations have emerged throughout the country.'
to be disregarded by the Commission insofar as "[i]t may have a vital and important bearing upon the ability of the applicant adequately to serve his public." Id. at 476. The
Court, however, held that § 402(b) of the Act, which provides in part for appeal to the
D.C. Circuit "by any other person aggrieved or whose interests are adversely affected,"
conferred the requisite standing for the licensee to secure judicial review of the Commission's order granting the application. Id. at 476-77.
10 See FCC v. National Broadcasting Co., 819 U.S. 239 (1943). The Court held that
where the grant of a new station license would cause electrical interference with the
signals of an existing station in the service area, under § 312(b) of the Communications
Act, the licensee was entitled to be made a party to the Commission proceeding on the
license application. Furthermore, the denial of the opportunity to be heard before the
Commission made the petitioner sufficiently aggrieved to merit a right of appeal to the
D.C. Circuit.
11 Asserting the rights of all listeners to receive balanced programming on controversial issues, a group of television viewers with substantial membership in the station's
prime service area sought to block the license renewal of station WLBT in Jackson,
Mississippi. The petitioners attacked the station's operations charging racial discrimination and a general failure to provide fair and balanced coverage of significant public
issues. Lamar Life Broadcasting Co., 38 F.C.C. 1143, 1148-53, 5 P & F RADno REG. 2d 205,
213-18 (1965).
121d. at 1149 n.ll, 5 P &cF RADIO REG. 2d at 214 n.ll. According to the Commission,
members of the public will be granted standing only if they can show "a direct causal
relationship between the action being protested and some injury of a tangible and substantial nature." Id.
'8 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
14 Id. at 1009. The court imposed an affirmative duty on the Commission to use its
broad discretionary powers to establish rules and procedures to encourage the public to
participate and assist the Commission in vindicating the public interest. Id. at 1005-06.
15 Id. at 1002-05.
1OId. at 1005.
17 Literally hundreds of groups throughout the United States have coalesced to work
for the improvement of radio and television. In addition, organizations have been
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The liberalization of standing requirements in the landmark
Church of Christ decision has been a great boon to interested members of the listening public.' 8 The extent to which the FCC has honored
the Church of Christ mandate to expand the public's influence on
Commission action, however, has been disappointing, 9 and thus not
all obstacles to effective public participation have been removed.
Repeatedly, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit has had to overturn many of the FCC's decisions
and remind the Agency of its paramount duty to regulate in the public
20
interest.
Recently, changes in radio program formats21 have evoked the
formed for the purpose of representing and aiding community groups in their efforts.
Fifteen such organizations are listed in a citizens guide published by the United Church
of Christ. See R. Shayon, Parties in Interest: A Citizens Guide to Improving Television and
Radio 26 (1974) (Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ, 289 Park Ave.
South, New York, N.Y.). More comprehensive treatment of citizen participation in broadcasting may be found in two other publications of the United Church of Christ. See
R. BENNETr, A LAwYERs' SouRcamooK: REPRESENTING THE AuDIENCE IN BROADCAST PRocEEDiNGs (1974) [hereinafter cited as BENNMrr]; R. JENNINGS & P. RICHARD, How To PROTECr
YOUR RIGrs IN TELEVISION AND RADIo (1974) [hereinafter cited as JENNINGS].
18 Since 1966 citizens have become increasingly active in the broadcasting field. See
Special Report: The Struggle over Broadcast Access (pts. 1-2), 81 BROADCASTING, Sept. 20,
1971, at 32; Sept. 27, 1971, at 24. FCC Chairman Burch noted that the industry is not
very receptive toward this phenomenon:
By and large, this may be the scheme that was originally intended-more citizens playing a role in broadcasting. I don't think broadcasters welcome this. It's
easier to run your own show than to answer to anyone else.
Id. pt. 2, Sept. 27, 1971, at 25.
19 In 1971, Commissioner Johnson remarked that in the four years following the
Church of Christ decision the Commission had "done little to encourage actual citizen
participation in its proceedings other than to say that it 'encourages' such participation."
Johnson, A New Fidelity to the Regulatory Ideal, 59 GEO. L.J. 869, 877 (1971). He further
explained that
the FCC's initial, instinctive reaction was to oppose, not encourage, greater
citizen participation in its proceedings, and that it took a forceful judicial
opinion to preserve this valuable right. This bias against citizen-initiated criticisms of the broadcasting industry has remained within the structure, procedures,
and pre-disposition of the Commission.
Id. See also note 20 and accompanying text infra.
20 See, e.g., Joseph v. FCC, 404 F.2d 207 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (per curiam). In Joseph, the
court criticized the Commission's failure to make a finding that the public interest, convenience, and necessity would be served by the granting of the assignment application
in question. In response to the Commission's contention that such finding might be implied
from the grant, the court warned: "When Congress requires a finding, its instruction is
not to be ignored or given only lip service." Id. at 211 (footnote omitted). See also
Saginaw Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 96 F.2d 554 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
21 A change in program format involves the abandonment of one type of specialized
programming to permit the operation of another, as, for example, a change from "classical" or "progressive rock" to "middle-of-the-road" or "country-and-western." See, e.g.,
Citizens Comm. to Keep Progressive Rock v. FCC, 478 F.2d 926 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Citizens
Comm. v. FCC, 436 F.2d 263 (D.C. Cir. 1970). While most format changes have accompanied an assignment of the license of the station, a few cases have involved changes in
the middle of the licensed period. See notes 157-63 and accompanying text infra.
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concern of a number of citizen groups.2 2 Wary of its authority to act
in this area, the Commission has shown little initiative in establishing
any firm policy toward format changes.2 3 As in other areas of broadcast
25
regulation,24 the FCC has waited for the courts to define its role.
This note will analyze varying views of the Commission's responsibilities in overseeing format changes.
An examination of the statutory scheme of broadcast regulation
indicates that while Congress in the early twentieth century could not
have possibly envisioned the complex system of electronic media which
would evolve in the next fifty years, it possessed the foresight to create
a statutory framework sufficiently flexible to meet future demands of
the industry. In particular, it has been suggested that the public interest standard established in the Communications Act could be read
as authorizing the Commission "to directly increase diversity of ideas
and programming ..
."2( Developments in the nature and character
of radio broadcasting and enlightened participation by the listening
public demand that the Commission recognize its responsibility to
allow for effective public input in formulating broadcast regulatory

policies. Recent decisions of the Court of Appeals of the District of
Columbia Circuit indicate some movement in this direction. Effective
achievement of this goal, however, would seem to require not only
substantial changes in the FCC's view of its authority, but also an
expansion of current procedural remedies.
COMMUNICATIONS REGULATION -

A

SCENARIO

It has always been assumed that broadcasting is a unique area.
Although the airways and broadcast spectrum constitute "public domain, 1 7 the number of airwaves is limited, and access to this valuable
22 For a discussion of recent attempts by listeners' groups to block entertainment
format changes see notes 108-40 and accompanying text infra.
23 The Commission has taken the position that
the station's program format is a matter best left to the discretion of the licensee
or applicant, since as a matter of public acceptance and of economic necessity he
will tend to program to meet the preferences of his area and fill whatever void

is left by the programming of other stations.
Primer on Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast Applicants, 27 F.C.C.2d
650, 679, 21 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 1507, 1538 (1971) (footnote omitted).

24 See, e.g., Friends of the Earth v. FCC, 449 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (application
of fairness doctrine to product advertising); Citizens Communication Center v. FCC, 447
F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Commission's poliies on license renewals); Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (intervention by members of the listening public).
25 See notes 141-56 and accompanying text infra.
26 Citizens Comm. to Save WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d 252, 273 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (rehearing
en banc) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring).
27 "The ether is a public medium, and its use must be for public benefit. The use
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public resource is necessarily restricted. Technical restraints and limitations - allocation of available frequencies and the regulation of the
employment of transmission equipment - are necessary in order to
put the airwaves to any effective use at all. Realizing this, in 1912,
Congress, pursuant to its authority to regulate interstate commerce,
vested in the Secretary of Commerce the initial authority to regulate
interstate communication by radio.28 Because of the limited powers
granted to the Secretary, this legislation proved to be ineffective to
deal with the broadcast interference and virtual chaos created by the
emerging commercial radio industry.29 Responding to demands from
the public and the industry itself, to remedy this situation, Congress
enacted the Radio Act of 1927.30 The Act vested in the Federal Radio
Commission broad licensing and regulatory powers over radio communication. 31 Spurred by dissatisfaction with the 1927 Act, Congress
later passed the Communications Act of 1934.32 To execute and enforce
the Act in accordance with the "public interest, convenience, and
necessity," the Federal Communications Commission was created,m
of a radio channel is justified only if there is a public benefit." Hearings on S. 1 &' S. 1754
Before the Senate Comm. on Interstate Commerce, 69th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 1, at 56 (1926)
(Opening Address by Herbert Hoover, Secretary of Commerce).
28 Act of Aug. 13, 1912, ch. 287, 37 Stat. 302.
29 Although the Act contained no express grant of authority to make regulations,
the Secretary was given the power to award licenses. This authority was rendered meaningless, however, when in 1923, the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia Circuit
ruled that mandamus would lie to compel the Secretary to issue a license. The court held
that the duty imposed was "purely ministerial" and that the only permissible exercise of
discretion by the Secretary was "in selecting a wave length, within the limitations prescribed in the statute, which, in his judgment, will result in the least possible interference."
Hoover v. Intercity Radio Co., 286 F. 1003, 1006, 1007 (D.C. Cir. 1923), appeal dismissed
per stipulation, 266 U.S. 636 (1924). The final blow to any vestige of authority came in
1926 when a district court held that a licensee may use any wavelengths within the specifications of the Act, regardless of the limitations set forth in the license by the Secretary.
United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 12 F.2d 614 (N.D. IM. 1926). Confusion and chaos
resulted from the lack of regulation. "With everybody on the air, nobody could be heard."
National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 212 (1943).
30 Act of Feb. 23, 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162.
31 Id. § 3. See generally L. SCHmEcKEBIER, THE EDmAr. RADIO COMMISSION (1932).
32 Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified in 47 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq.
(1970)). Broadcast regulation suffered numerous serious disabilities under the Federal Radio
Commission. See E.KPASNOW & L. LONGLEY, THE PoLIcs OF BROADCAST REGULATION 11-14
(1973) [hereinafter cited as KRASNOW & LONGLEY]. The 1934 legislation marked a significant improvement in the structure of regulation. Id. at 14-16. "But the objectives of the
legislation have remained substantially unaltered since 1927." National Broadcasting Co.
v. United States, 319 US. 190, 214 (1943).
33 The FCC has authority over all forms of "interstate and foreign commerce in
communication by radio and wire," Communications Act of 1934 § 1, 47 U.S.C. § 151
(1970), including that by common carriers. Id. §§ 201-23, 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-23.
The elusive concept of "public interest, convenience, and necessity" is the broad
"standard" under which Congress delegated authority to both the FRC and the FCC. See
notes 44-51 and accompanying text infra.
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and was given broad licensing, 34 rulemaking,35 and administrative
authority.3 6
Having recognized the technical and economic need for some type

of broadcasting regulation, Congress could have elected to provide for
government control, a course pursued by numerous other countries.3 7
Instead, Congress chose to maintain the area of communications as one
of free competition 8 under the aegis of an independent supervisory

commission.3 9 The choice was undoubtedly motivated by traditional
views of democracy and free enterprise. Consequently, the idea that a
broadcaster should operate as a common carrier was explicitly rejected

by the legislators. 40 On the other hand, allocation and regulation, and
not the creation of any private property rights, are the clear purposes
84 See Communications Act of 1934 § 307(a), 47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1970); id. § 309(a), 47
U.S.C. § 309(a).
85 See id. § 303(a), (f), (h), (i), 0), (n), 47 U.S.C. § 303(a), (f), (h), (i), (0), (n).
36See id. § 312(a), 47 US.C. § 12(a) (revocation of license); id. § 312(b), 47 U.S.C.
§ 312(b) (issuance of cease and desist orders); id. § 316(a), 47 U.S.C. § 316(a) (modification
of licenses); id. § 503(b), 47 U.S.C. § 503(b) (assessment of forfeitures).
37For
an in-depth analysis of broadcasting systems in all parts of the world see
W. EMERY, NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS OF BROADCASTING: THmE
HIsToRY,
OPERATION AND CONTROL

(1969). The author notes a number of interesting trends in the

regulatory systems of many countries:
(1) Especially in Western Europe, national regulatory policies seem to be shifting
away from strict governmental control toward greater autonomy in broadcasting. The
author also indicates, however, that there are countertrends in a minority of countries.
(2) There has been a general increase in the diversity of programs, i.e., a trend
toward "balanced programming" designed to meet a variety of public interests and
needs.
(8) There has been an expanded use of the mass media for educational purposes.
(4) In some areas, citizens groups have become increasingly active in working for
greater freedom of expression and access to conflicting points of view on issues of
public importance.
Id. at xxx-xxxi.
88 Congress intended to leave competition in the business of broadcasting where
it found it, to permit a licensee who was not interfering electrically with other
broadcasters to survive or succumb according to his ability to make his programs
attractive to the public.
FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 475 (1940).
39 See S. REP. No. 772, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926).
The exercise of this power is fraught with such great possibilities that it should
not be entrusted to any one man nor to any administrative department of the
Government. This regulatory power should be as free from political influence
or arbitrary control as possible.
Id. at 2.
40 Fearful of the discretionary power on the part of a broadcaster to reject applications
for service, a number of Congressmen were of the opinion that radio should be regulated
as a public utility. See, e.g., 67 CONG. Rac. 5488 (1926) (remarks of Congressman Davis).
Congress specifically rejected these contentions by enacting § 3(h) of the Communications
Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1970), which provides, in part, that "a person engaged in
radio broadcasting shall not, insofar as such person is engaged, be deemed a common
carrier."
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of the Act. 41 No person may operate a broadcasting facility except in
accordance with the Act, and with a license granted thereunder by the
Commission. 42 In reviewing an application for a license, the Commission must find not only that the applicant is technically, financially,
and legally qualified to operate the station, but also that the grant of
such application will serve the public interest, convenience, and
43
necessity.
Public Interest Mandate
A salient feature of the broadcast media's regulatory system is the
public interest mandate which pervades the Communications Act and
establishes the standard for broadcast regulation. 44 Coming to grips
with the expansive perimeter of this mandate is essential in order to
reach a proper definition of the FCC's role in broadcasting regulation.
Yet, the very breadth of this provision militates against achieving such
a goal.
Vague, indefinite standards which often result from a broad definition of authority are typical of congressional delegations. 45 It is
thought that restrictive, inflexible definitions of authority would thwart
the purpose of an independent body of experts established to carry out
Congress' legislative policy.46 A broad mandate, on the other hand,
lends an air of legitimacy to agency action, or inaction, as the case may
be, and in that sense is supportive. Its unquestionable ambiguity "produces a fertile field for imaginative advocacy in arguing about what
41 The stated purpose of the subchapter relating to radio is
to maintain the control of the United States over all the channels of interstate and
foreign radio transmission; and to provide for the use of such channels, but not
the ownership thereof, by persons for limited periods of time, under licenses
granted by Federal authority, and no such license shall be construed to create any
right, beyond the terms, conditions, and periods of the license.
Communications Act of 1934 § 301, 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1970) (emphasis added). See also
FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 474-75 (1940).
42 Communications Act of 1934 § 301, 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1970).
4 Id. § 307(a), (d), 47 US.C. § 307(a), (d); id. § 309(a), 47 U.S.C. § 309(a); Henry v.
FCC, 302 F.2d 191 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
44 See Communications Act of 1934 § 307(a), (d), 47 U.S.C. § 307(a), (d) (1970); id.
§ 309(a), 47 U.S.C. § 309(a); id. § 310(b), 47 U.S.C. § 310(b); id. § 311(c), 47 U.S.C. § 311(c);
id. § 316(a), 47 U.S.C. § 316(a); id. § 319(c), (d), 47 U.S.C. § 319(c), (d).
45 See DAvis, supra note 2,
2.03, at 81-87.
46 While this criterion [public interest, convenience, and necessity] is as concrete
as the complicated factors for judgment in such a field of delegated authority
permit, it serves as a supple instrument for the exercise of discretion by the expert
body which Congress has charged to carry out its legislative policy.... Underlying
the whole law is recognition of the rapidly fluctuating factors characteristic of the
evolution of broadcasting and the corresponding requirement that the administrative process possess sufficient flexibility to adjust itself to these factors.
FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940).
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serves the public interest." 47 Further, it insures that the Commission's
duty to "generally encourage the larger and more effective use of radio
in the public interest 4 8 is not read as limited to regulating the engineering and technical aspects of radio communication. The notion of
the Commission merely acting "as a kind of traffic officer, policing the
wave lengths to prevent stations from interfering with each other" is
inconsistent with the statutory mandate.4 9 Yet, the Act cannot be
construed to confer unlimited authority. 50 One certainty resulting
from this generalized public interest mandate, therefore, is that it will
continue to provide "the battleground for broadcasting's regulatory
debate." 51
First Amendment Considerations
Broadcasting, even for entertainment purposes, is dearly within
the ambit of the constitutional guarantee of free speech. 2 The inextricable involvement of the first amendment in the area of broadcasting
-

both from the public's and the broadcaster's viewpoints

-makes

the Commission's task of regulation all the more arduous.
The underlying premise of the first amendment is that "the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public."5 3 The tradi5
tional pursuit of such diversity through "a multitude of tongues"
completely unrestricted in speech, however, is not feasible in radio
broadcasting because it is subject to inherent physical limitations. The
Commission's principal approach to increasing the variety of speakers
has been to require diversification of control.55 Yet, this insures only
47 BENNE=r, supra note 17, at 29.
48 Communications Act of 1934 § 303(g), 47 US.C. § 303(g) (1970).
49 National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 US. 190, 215-16 (1943).
50 This [public interest] criterion is not to be interpreted as setting up a standard
so indefinite as to confer an unlimited power. . . . The requirement is to be
interpreted by its context ....
Federal Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 US. 266, 285 (1933)
(footnotes omitted).
51 KPASNOW & LONGLEY, supra note 31, at 16, quoting N. Mmow,EQuAL Tiarm: THE
PRIVATE BROADCAsTr

AND THE PUBLic IumTamsr 8 (1964).

52 See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501-02 (1952) (motion pictures);
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 US. 131, 166 (1948) (motion pictures).
53 Associated Press v. United States, 326 US. 1, 20 (1945). See also Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 895 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 US. 557, 564 (1969).
54 United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362. 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), aff'd, 326

US. 1 (1945).
55 Two kinds of rules comprise the Commission's present policy concerning diversification of control of radio broadcast facilities. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.35, 73.240 (1974);
Amendment of §§ 73.35, 73.240 and 73.636 of the Commission's Rules Relating to Multiple
Ownership of Standard, FM and Television Broadcast Stations (First Report and Order),
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limited diversity and the right of unrestricted speech remains abridged
to many who may wish to use radio as a means of communication.
In direct conflict with the first amendment interests of the public
is the broadcaster's right to exercise his freedom of speech in using
the medium which has been licensed to him. These competing interests
engender an inquiry into the extent to which the responsibility for
creating the widest possible diversity may be impressed upon the
broadcaster. The history of broadcast regulation indicates that the
licensee's first amendment rights are "abridgeable,"5 6 but that does
not mean that they are nonexistent. The argument has been, 57 and
continues to be, made that broadcasting is a form of journalism and,
therefore, should be permitted to enjoy the same unrestricted freedom
22 F.C.C.2d 306, 18 P &F RAio REG. 2d 1735 (1970). The duopoly rules proscribe "common
ownership, operation or control of more than one unlimited-time broadcast station in the
same area, regardless of the type of broadcast service involved." Id. at 307, 18 P &F RADIo
REG. 2d at 1738 (footnote omitted). The concentration of control rules provide that
a license for a broadcast station will not be granted to a party if the grant would
result in that party's owning, operating or controlling more than a specified
number [seven for AM and FM radio] of stations in the same broadcast service.
Id. at 307, 18 P &-F RADIO REG. 2d at 1737.
While the FCC intended that diversification of control be a significant factor in
weighing applications for new stations, assignments, and transfers, it proposed to ignore
the issue in renewal situations. See id. at 306-07, 18 P & F RADIo REG. 2d at 1736-37. The
District of Columbia Court of Appeals has specifically disapproved of this policy. See
Citizens Communication Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201, 1214 n.36 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ("Diversification is a factor properly to be weighed . . . at a renewal hearing.').
COSee Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Natl Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 146
(1973). The inherent physical limitations of the broadcast medium formed the basic
rationale for the Court's upholding of the FCC's Chain Broadcasting Regulations in
National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943). Countering the broadcasters' argument that the regulations constituted a denial of free speech, the Court stated:
The right of free speech does not include, however, the right to use the facilities
of radio without a license. ... The standard [Congress] provided for the licensing
of stations was the "public interest, convenience, or necessity." Denial of a station
license on that ground, if valid under the Act, is not a denial of free speech.
Id. at 227 (Murphy, J., dissenting). The Court again sanctioned limitations on the
broadcasters' freedom of speech in a scarce medium in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
395 U.S. 367, 392 (1969) ("There is no sanctuary in the First Amendment for unlimited
private censorship operating in a medium not open to all.'). Here, however, the Court
went beyond the scarcity rationale in its recognition of a "collective right [of the people
as a whole] to have the medium function consistently with the ends and purposes of the
First Amendment." Id. at 390.
57 See, e.g., NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS, BROADCASTING AND THE BILL OF
RIGHTS (1971) [hereinafter cited as NA.B.]. This book contains a compilation of the formal
statements made by various representatives of the broadcasting industry at public hearings
held in 1947. The hearings were before a subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce regarding a bill (S. 1333) to amend the Communications Act.
"'Audible journalism,"' id. at 113, the broadcasters feel, deserves equal rights under the
law, along with the press. Id. at 54-64 (statement by Robert K. Richards), 82-83 (statement by J. Harold Ryan), 110-13 (statement by Don. S. Elias), 150-51 (statement by Frank
Stanton).
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as does the press.58 Indeed, until recently, the first amendment rights
of the broadcast licensee have been paramount. It has never been accepted, however, that freedom of the press can exist to the same extent
in a medium which is licensed by the government.5 9 Yet, when members of the public have attempted to assert a complementary first
amendment interest in the operation of the radio, they have encountered
not only an unreceptiveness to their constitutional theory, but also

a crabbed judicial view of "state action" - a view that the "[First]
Amendment limits only the action of Congress or of agencies of the
federal government and not private corporations such as [broadcast licensees]."' 6 0
The history of regulation shows that the public interest mandate
is broad and flexible. While the Commission is clearly prohibited
from acting as a censor,(" it cannot neglect its duty to promote the
legitimate interests of the public. 62 Yet, the broadcaster will argue
that he best vindicates the public interest,6 3 and that competition among
broadcasters for a listening audience alone will insure his responsiveness to at least a majority of the public. 64 That success in the market58 See Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Natl Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 148-70
(1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
59 See id. at 117-18 (1973).
Broadcasters are licensed by the Government. Newspapers are not and may not,
under our Constitution, be licensed by any governmental authority. This is an
essential difference. The public responsibility of newspapers rests on professional
ethics and tradition which encompass the entire relation between the editor and
his readers -the free press and the American people. In broadcasting, the responsibility derived from its status as "free press" is in addition to other responsibilities, flowing from the fact of a Government license. The sum of these
responsibilities is imposed by law.
H.R.REP,. No. 281, 88th Cong., Ist Sess., at 25 (1963). But see Columbia Broadcasting Sys.,
Inc. v. Democratic Natl Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 148-170 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
60 Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642, 650 (D.C. Cir.
1971), quoting Massachusetts Universalist Convention v. Hildreth & Rogers, Co., 183 F.2d
497, 501 (Ist Cir. 1950) and McIntire v. Win. Penn Broadcasting Co., 151 F.2d 597, 601
(3d Cir. 1945).
61 Communications Act of 1934 § 326, 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1970).
62 The Commission's role has been characterized by the Supreme Court as that of an
'overseer' and ultimate arbiter and guardian of the public interest." Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 117 (1973).
63 See, e.g., N.A.B., supra note 57, at 112.
The essential freedom of radio is safer in the hands of these 1,700 broadcasters
... than in the custody of seven men domiciled in Washington.... We broadcasters are more representative of the varied social, economic, political and
geographical pattern which is the United States of America. We are necessarily
closer to the listeners for whom radio exists; therefore, more sensitive to the
disciplines of listener opinions.
Id. (statement by Don S. Elias, Exec. Director of Station WWNC, Asheville, N.C.).
64 See, e.g., id. at 107-08.
The natural law of preference on the part of the public has been the natural law
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place does not necessarily indicate satisfaction of the interests and
needs of substantial portions of the listening public is evident from
the frequent protests by sizeable listeners' groups dissatisfied with current radio programming. It would seem, therefore, as Chief Justice
Bazelon of the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals has
said, that "[t]he question to be faced ultimately is... whether...
[we] should move away from the [traditional] rule of a multitude of
tongues unrestricted in speech in pursuit of the goal of a true diversity
of ideas." 6 5
The FCC and the courts have thus far pursued a balancing approach to the competing first amendment interests involved in programming decisions. 60 Although it is clearly the right of the listeners
which is to be paramount, 7 balancing the conflicting interests of the
licensee and the listening public in the area of program format is particularly problematic since decisions concerning the content of programming traditionally have been thought to lie in the sole discretion
of the licensee. 68 Nevertheless, the FCC has, on its own initiative, and
determining the success or failure of private American business enterprise. The
manufacturer, the individual merchant, the newspaper - all survive and thrive or

decline and fall on the natural law of public preference....

All the business regulation that radio needs is open competition in its field,
and the radio audience and the advertisers will become the most compelling
and exacting regulatory forces that could be devised.
Id. (statements by Marshall Pengra, Manager, Station KRNR, Roseburg, Oregon).
65 Citizens Comm. to Save WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d 252, 274 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (rehearing
en banc) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring) (emphasis added).
66See Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 US. 94,
102-03, 125 (1973).
The maintenance of this balance for more than 40 years has called on both
the regulators and the licensees to walk a "tightrope" to preserve the First
Amendment values written into the Radio Act and its successor, the Communications Act.
Id. at 117.
67 See Hearings on S. 1 & S. 1754 Before the Senate Comm. on Interstate Commerce,
69th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 56 (1926) (Opening Address by Herbert Hoover, Secretary of
Commerce). "The dominant element for consideration in the radio field is, and always
will be, the great body of the listening public ...." Id.
The emphasis must be first and foremost on the interest, the convenience, and
the necessity of the listening public, and not on the interest, convenience, or
necessity of the individual broadcaster or the advertiser.
FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138-39 n.2 (1940), quoting 2 FmE. RADio
CoAni'N RE. 169-70 (1928). See also Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390
(1969), citing FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 475 (1940).
6s See Primer on Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast Applicants,
27 F.C.C.2d 650, 679, 21 P 8: F RADIO REG. 2d 1507, 1538 (1971); Programming Policy

Statement, 25 Fed. Reg. 7291, Network Programming Inquiry-Report and Statement
of Policy, 20 P 8-F RADio REG. 1901 (1960) [although differently entitled in the official and
unofficial compilations, this policy statement will be hereinafter cited as Programming
Policy Statement].
In advising the public that they cannot direct the broadcaster as to the airing of
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more often upon the insistence of the courts and the public, circumscribed the free exercise of discretion by the broadcasting licensee in
programming matters.
Supervision of Programming
Under the Radio Act of 1927, the Federal Radio Commission
made limited inquiries into program content. In a few early cases it
refused to renew the licenses of broadcasters whose programs were
found to be fraudulent or defamatory.6 9 Similarly, under the Communications Act, the FCC has imposed sanctions for illegal and
deceptive broadcasts7 0 and has even gone so far as to consider, in evaluating renewal applications, the broadcasting of offensive or improper
material.71 Recently the Commission has assessed forfeitures 2 against
stations whose broadcasts it determined to be obscene. 8
More often, the FCC has exerted greater influence over programming through indirect means, viz, the imposition of general standards
and programming policies. Fear of being denied an application for the
grant or renewal of a license has forced broadcaster compliance with
these prescriptions. In 1960 the FCC released a ProgrammingPolicy
Statement74 defining the respective roles of the licensee 5 and the Cornparticular programs, the Commissioners made it dear that they are not "arbiters of
taste." Moreover, their concern "is with matters which affect the community generally
(the public interest) rather than with the personal preferences or grievances of individuals." Broadcast Procedure Manual, 39 Fed. Reg. 32,288, 32289, The Public and
Broadcasting-A Procedure Manual, 49 F.C.C.2d 1, 3 (1974) [although differently entitled
in the official and unofficial compilations, this manual will be hereinafter cited as Procedure Manual].
69 See, e.g., Trinity Methodist Church, South v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 62 F.2d
850 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 599 (1932) (defamatory broadcasts); KFKB Broadcasting Ass'n, Inc. v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 47 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1931) (broadcast of
harmful medical advice).
70 In KWK Radio, Inc., 34 F.C.C. 1039, 25 P & F RADio REG. 577 (1963), the Commission ordered the revocation of KWK's license for the broadcast of fraudulent and deceptive contests. In WRETL Radio Station, Inc., 2 F.C.C. 687 (1935), the FCC designated the
station's renewal application for a hearing because of complaints about broadcasts relating
to illegal lotteries. Ultimately renewal was granted, however, since the station cancelled
the programs in question.
71 See Palmetto Broadcasting Co., 83 F.C.C. 250, 28 P & F RADIO REG. 483 (1961),
aff'd sub nom. Robinson v. FCC, 834 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 843 (1964).
Here, the broadcasting of vulgar and suggestive material formed a basis for the Commission's denial of station WDKS's application for renewal.
72 A milder sanction than revocation, forfeiture is a monetary penalty imposed for
the violation of Commission rules or regulations. See Communications Act of 1934
§ 503(b), 47 U.S.C. § 503(b) (1970).
73 See WGLD-FM, 41 F.C.C.2d 919 (1973), aff'd sub nom. Illinois Citizens Comm. for
Broadcasting v. FCC, 515 F.2d 407 (1974), rehearing en banc denied, 515 F.2d 407 (D.C.
Cir. 1975).
74 Programming Policy Statement, supra note 68, at 7291, 20 P & F RADio REG. 1901
(1960).
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mission 76 in the area of programming. The statement enunciated 14

general categories of program types 77 which would be used by the
Commission in judging an applicant's past or proposed programming.
Additionally, the statement stressed that
the principal ingredient of the licensee's obligation to operate his
station in the public interest is the diligent, positive, and continu-

ing effort by the licensee to discover and fulfill the tastes, needs,
78
and desires of his community or service area for broadcast service.

This "ascertainment requirement" was subsequently explained by the
Commission as requiring the applicant to consult with community
leaders and members of the general public to discover their problems,
needs, and interests7 9 Thus, all license applications require the applicant to demonstrate that he has complied with the FCC's ascertainment procedures, to report the results of community surveys, and to
75 [Rlesponsibility for the selection and presentation of broadcast material ultimately devolves upon the individual station licensee.... Mhe fulfillment of the
public interest requires the free exercise of his independent judgment.
Id. at 7293, 20 P &F RADIo REG. at 1908.

76 In discussing the limitations imposed by the first amendment and § 326 of the
Communications Act on its authority to act in the area of programming, the Commission
stated that while

(it] does not conceive that it is barred by the Constitution or by statute from
exercising any responsibility for programming... [i]t readily concedes that it is
precluded from examining a program for taste or content, unless the recognized
exceptions to censorship apply: for example, obscenity, profanity, indecency,

programs inciting to riots, programs designed or inducing toward the commission
of crime, lotteries, etc.
Id., 20 P & F RADIo Rxo. at 1909 (emphasis added).

77 The "major elements usually necessary to meet the public interest" as set forth by

the Commission included:
(I) Opportunity for Local Self-Expression, (2) The Development and Use of Local
Talent, (3) Programs for Children, (4) Religious Programs, (5) Educational Programs, (6) Public Affairs Programs, (7) Editorialization by Licensees, (8) Political
Broadcasts, (9) Agricultural Programs, (10) News Programs, (11) Weather and
Market Reports, (12) Sports Programs, (13) Service to Minority Groups, (14) Entertainment Programming.
Id. at 7295, 20 P & F RADio REG. at 1913. The Commission emphasized that these guidelines were not intended as
a rigid mold for station performance, nor.., as a Commission formula for broadcast service in the public interest. Rather, they should be considered as indicia
of the types and areas of service which, on the basis of experience, have usually
been accepted by the broadcasters as more or less included in the practical definition of community needs and interests.
Id., 20 P & F RADIO REG. at 1912.
In revising application forms in 1965, the Commission reduced the programming
types to eight major categories. See Amendment of Section IV of Broadcast Application
Forms 301, 303, 314, and 315, 1 F.C.C.2d 439, 442-43, 5 P & F RADio REG. 2d 1773, 1777-78
(1965).
78 25 Fed. Reg. at 7293, 20 P & F RADIo REG. at 1915.
79 See Primer on Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast Applicants,
27 F.C.C.2d 650, 21 P & F RADio REG. 2d 1507 (1971).
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propose programming and commercial practices designed to meet the
80
ascertainment problems and needs.
Based on the assumption that a licensee using public property
should not be entitled to monopolize that use for the presentation of
a single point of view, a series of early decisions developed the concept
of fairness."' Spurred by these decisions, in 1949 the FCC issued a
Report on Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees,8 2 which enunciated
the Commission's policy on the discussion of public issues. This policy,
which has since been known as the fairness doctrine, "imposes two
affirmative responsibilities on the broadcaster: coverage of issues of
public importance must be adequate and must fairly reflect differing
viewpoints."8' 3 The doctrine has been given statutory8 4 and judicial
approval.8 5 The fairness doctrine leaves the question of access and the
specific handling of public issues to the discretion of the licensee 86
With respect to political broadcasts, however, the Commission has
developed access requirements in the "personal attack '8 7 and "equal
opportunity"88 rules.
One of the most effective means for regulation of program content
employed by the Commission, however, is the licensing process itself.
In considering an application for the issuance, renewal, or transfer of
So See AM-FM Program Forms, FCC ForM Nos. 301, 303, § IV-A (Statement of Program Service), pts. I-IV, appearing in P & F RADIO REG. Current Serv. Vol.
98, at
98:301-13 to -16, 98:303-7 to -10.
81 See, e.g., United Broadcasting Co. (WHKC), 10 F.C.C. 515, 517-18 (1945); Mayflower
Broadcasting Corp., 8 F.C.C. 333, 339-40 (1941). See also Editorializing by Broadcast
Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1249-50, 1 P & F RADIo REG.
91, at 91:201, 91:204-05 (1949)
and cases cited therein.
82 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1 P & F RADIo REG. $ 91, at 91:201 (1949).
8a Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Natl Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 111
(1973). The Commission recently reiterated its policy based upon a three year inquiry on
the fairness doctrine. See The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and
the Public Interest Standards of the Communications Act, 48 F.C.C.2d 1, 2-21 (1974).
84 In 1959 Congress amended § 315 of the Communications Act to give statutory
approval to the fairness doctrine. Act of Sept. 14, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-274, 73 Stat. 557,
amending Act of July 16, 1952, Ch. 879, § 11, 66 Stat. 717 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 315(a)
(Supp. II, 1973)).
8 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
SB$ee The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public
Interest Standards of the Communications Act, 48 F.C.C.2d 1, 8-9, 28-31 (1974).
87 See 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.123, 73.300 (1974). The constitutionality of the personal attack
rule was upheld in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
88 Equal opportunity for political candidates has been required by § 315 of the Act
since its passage in 1934. See Communications Act of 1934 § 315(a), 47 U.S.C. § 315(a)
(Supp. II, 1973). The rule requires a licensee who permits "any person who is a legally
qualified candidate for any public office to use a broadcasting station, [to]afford equal
opportunities to all other such candidates for that office in the use of such broadcasting
station." Id. See also 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.120, 73.290 (1974).
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a station license, the Commission will necessarily look to a station's
past or proposed programming in determining whether such grant
would serve the public interest. Since members of the public "possess
first-hand knowledge of their community's needs and the broadcaster's performance in meeting them,"8' 9 they have the opportunity to
make a valuable contribution to the improvement of broadcasting by
actively participating in the agency's licensing procedures. 90 Listeners'
groups, being the most adversely affected by unsatisfactory programming, have been particularly outspoken in the area of program content.
Since all new applicants and existing licensees are required to give
public notice of the filing of an application, 91 listeners have the opportunity through the filing of an "informal objection" to alert the Commission, before any action is taken on the application, as to any
matter, including objectionable programming, which might lead to
the disqualification of a particular applicant.9 2 If listeners seek more
active participation, they may, subject to certain statutory requirements, 93 request to become a party to the proceedings before the Coin89 JENNINGs, supra note 17, at 2.
90 Another means of participation which may be easily pursued by any person, at
any time, is the filing with the Commission of a letter of complaint against a broadcast
station. If the letter of complaint alleges specific facts which indicate substantial violation of a statute, Commission rule, or policy, the matter will be investigated. Depending
upon what the investigation uncovers, Commission sanctions may range from the assessment of a monetary forfeiture to denial of renewal or revocation of a station license.
A total of 61,322 complaints against broadcast stations were received by the Commission
during the fiscal year 1973. See Procedure Manual, supra note 68, at 32,288-91, 49 F.C.C.2d
at 3-7.
Interested listeners may wish to participate in the rulemaking processes of the FCC
by initiating a request for the promulgation of new rules. See id. at 32,294, 49 F.C.C.2d
at 13-14; Administrative Procedure Act § 4(d), 5 US.C. § 553(e) (1970); 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.401.407 (1943). Usually, the Commission is required to issue public notice and afford the
opportunity for public comment before making or changing a rule. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.412A15 (1974). Listeners may then comment and furnish information on rules already under
consideration by the Commission. See Procedure Manual, supra note 68, at 32,294-96,
49 F.C.C.2d at 14-16; 47 C.F.R. § 1.419 (1974).
91 See 47 C.F.R. § 1.580 (1974).
92

See Procedure Manual, supra note 68, at 32,291, 49 F.C.C.2d at 7-8. The objection

may be filed in simple letter form: The only requirement is that it be signed by the
objector. See 47 C.F.R. § 1.587 (1974). An objection which raises a substantial public
interest question will be made the subject of investigation by the FCC. If there remains
a substantial and material question of fact, or the Commission is unable to make the
finding that the grant of the pending application would be in the public interest, a
hearing may be ordered. At the subsequent hearing, the complainant may be permitted

to participate as a witness, see id. § 1.225, or acquire the status of a party to the proceeding by filing a petition to intervene. See 47 U.S.C. § 309(e) (1970); 47 C.F.R. § 1.223
(1974).
93 See Communications Act of 1934 § 309(d), 47 U.S.C. § 309(d) (1970); Procedure
Manual, supra note 68, at 32,291-93, 49 F.C.C2d at 8-10. If a petition fails to meet these
requirements, the Commission will treat it as an informal objection.
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mission by filing a formal objection in the form of a "petition to deny"
the issuance, renewal, or assignment of a station license. 94 Pending the
FCC's decision whether or not to order a hearing on the questions
raised by a community group, the station might attempt to negotiate
a settlement of their differences. Subject to Commission approval, the
station and the petitioners may enter into an agreement whereby the
listeners will withdraw their petition to deny in exchange for promises
of improved service by the licensee.9 5
Broadcasters, however, have not been receptive to any broadening
of governmental regulation. Arguing that Commission scrutiny of the
business practices of the licensee amounts to censorship, broadcasters
have urged Congress to amend the Communications Act to specifically
limit the FCC's regulatory authority to economic areas. 96 It is suggested, however, that it would be impossible for the Commission to
fulfill its duty under the public interest mandate should its determi94 See Procedure Manual, supra note 68, at 32,291-93, 49 F.C.C.2d at 8-11; Communications Act of 1934 § 309(d)(1), 47 U.S.C. § 309(d)(1) (1970). See also 47 C.F.R. §§ 1580(i),
1.201-07 (1974). If the petition to deny is granted by the Commission, the challenged
application will be designated for a hearing on some or all of the issues raised in the
petition. See Communications Act of 1934 § 309(d)(2), (e), 47 U.S.C. § 809(d)(2), (e) (1970).
If the petition is not granted, the petitioner may seek reconsideration, see Communications Act of 1934 § 405, 47 U.S.C. § 405 (1970); 47 C.F.R. § 1.106 (1974), or appeal
to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. See Communications
Act of 1934 § 402(b), 47 U.S.C. § 402(b) (1970).
95 See Communications Act of 1934 § 311(c), 47 U.S.C. § 311(c) (1970). Although this
section specifically refers to agreements between competing applicants, the Commission
has assumed the same authority to evaluate the terms of a compromise between a station
and members of the public. See note 173 and accompanying text infra. It should be
noted that such agreements will not pass Commission scrutiny if they are adjudged to
"improperly curtail the licensee's flexibility and discretion in the matters of programming
Bob Jones Univ., Inc., 32 F.C.C.2d 781, 23 P & F RADIO
and program scheduling .
RFG. 2d 410, 411 (1971).
96See N.A.B., supra note 57. In recommending that the Commission be prohibited
from regulating the business practices and programming of a broadcaster, one representative commented:
The authority to refuse to renew a license because of the nature of programs
that have been broadcast is a form of censorship much more powerful than the
blue pencilling kind of censorship. It permits the Commission a tremendously
wide latitude in determining what the listeners of the country may or may not
hear. It gives the Commission most persuasive powers of suggestion as to the
program which it feels should be broadcast. No licensee can feel free to ignore
such suggestions when to do so would jeopardize the continuation of his license.
This is a much greater power than the power to delete.
Id. at 191 (statement by Niles Trammell, Pres., Nat'1 Broadcasting Co., Inc.). For a
presentation of different views on current renewal policies and proposed legislative revision see Goldberg, A Proposal to DeregulateBroadcast Programming, 42 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 73 (1973) and Kramer, An Argument for Maintaining the Current FCC Controls, id.
at 93.
While the suppression of future 'publication because of past performance amounts to
an unconstitutional prior restraint, Near v. Minnesota, 283 US. 697, 713 (1931), the analogy to radio broadcasting has never been accepted by Congress or the courts. See note

59 and accompanying text supra.

1975]

LISTENERS' RIGHTS

nation as to the qualifications of a licensee be restricted to the evaluation of technical and economic considerations.
Because of the sensitive first amendment issues and the statutory
prohibition against censorship, the Commission has traditionally taken
a reticent attitude toward programming. Its principal approach has
been through the procedural and structural means outlined above. The
fairness and ascertainment requirements may be viewed as significant
restraints upon the broadcaster's choice of programming in that his
compliance with the prescribed rules and procedures will be a critical
factor in the Commission's determination as to the issuance, renewal,
or transfer of a station license. The FCC becomes most directly involved with programming through the fairness doctrine and related
rules concerning political broadcasts not only because continuous violations might be grounds for denial of an application, but also because
the Commission applies these rules to complaints against a station on a
case-by-case basis.97 The FCC's attempts to foster diversity have been
limited, however, to news and public affairs programming. The Commission makes no distinction among the many varieties of cultural and
entertainment programs,9 8 nor does it require that broadcasters ascertain program preferences. 99 Until very recently, the Commission has
successfully resisted any involvement with decisions on specialized
station formats.
PROGRAM FORMAT CHANGES

With the development of television and the overall expansion in
the number of radio frequencies, a new trend in radio broadcasting
emerged - specialized formats.100
97The Commission periodically publishes a digest of its fairness doctrine rulings.
See Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial Issues of
Public Importance, 40 F.C.C. 598 (1964). Upon recent consideration of proposals to limit
review of fairness complaints to renewal time, the Commission reaffirmed its present
procedure of reviewing complaints on an ongoing basis. See The Handling of Public
Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public Interest Standards of the Communications Act, 48 F.C.C.2d 1, 17-21 (1974).
98The Commission's definition of "entertainment programs" includes "all programs
intended primarily as entertainment, such as music, drama, variety, comedy, quiz etc."
See AM-FM Program Forms, FCC FoaR Nos. 301, 303, § IV-A (Definitions), appearing in
P &F RAnlo REG. Current Service Volume 98, at 98:301-20, 98:803-6.
99 The Commission's ascertainment requirements, see notes 78-80 and accompanying
text supra, contemplate onsultation with community leaders and members of the general
public to elidt community problems, not program preferences. See Primer on Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast Applicants, 27 F.C.C.2d 650, 656-57, 21 P & F
RADio REG. 2d 1507, 1514-15 (1971).
100 See H.R. REP. No. 281, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963) [hereinafter dted as HR. Rep.
No. 281]. "Certain things, programwise, that had been done well in radio could be done
superbly in television.... Television left for radio a more limited field of programming."
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In this evolution, radio did not initiate these changes; it adjusted
to them through necessity- through the necessity of building a
local and frequently specialized program that would support the
continuing interest of the public.' 0 '

Regulation of this specialized system of broadcasting necessitates a
reevaluation of policy, since uniform standards of "balanced programming" previously developed to regulate the unspecialized broadcaster

can no longer govern programming responsibility. 10 2 In addition, promotion of diversity, as applied to stations operating within specialized
frameworks, is complicated by the fact that some program formats are
inherently more profitable than others. 0 3 Thus, some stations will be
permitted to reap enormous gains while others carry the burden of
less profitable programming. 0 4 The Commission's regrettable adherence to traditional notions of programming responsibility, despite this
metamorphosis in broadcasting, has led to the current dilemma with
radio format changes.
Recent Decisions

Although it is expected that a station will adhere to the programming proposals set forth in its most recent application, the Commission
has never regarded the licensee's proposal as a "binding commitment."'105 This policy is designed to enable a licensee to fulfill its responsibility to its listening community by allowing it sufficient flexibility
to remain responsive to changes in public interests and needs. Therefore, the Commission has only required that a licensee give notice of
Id. at 437. Thus, "[t]here emerged a new lexicon in radio broadcasting-music and news
stations, the top 40 formula, good music stations, sports stations and the like." Id.
The FCC has recognized that in an area served by a number of broadcasting facilities,
the public interest in diversified programming could be served by complementary specialized formats. Herbert Muschel, 33 F.C.C. 37, 79, 18 P & F RADio REG. 8, 30 (1962).
101 H.R. REP. No. 281, supra note 100, at 437.
102 See Note, Regulation of Program Content by the FCC, 77 HARv. L. REv. 701, 706
(1964). The author points out that different criteria will have to be employed when
dealing with large metropolitan areas relying on a number of frequencies and smaller
geographical areas served by only one or two.
nhe idea of "balanced programming," in radio at least, lost its original meaning. . . . [I]n an area of "selective programing" . . . the elements of balanced
programing [are] shared by numerous stations.
H.R. REP. No. 281, supra note 100, at 437.
103 A popular music format, for example, generally has a broader range of appeal
than a classical format, and, consequently is more attractive to advertisers. Also, because
classical music selections are typically lengthy, there are less opportunities during a
broadcast day for commercial advertising interruptions.
104 See Note, Regulation of Program Content by the FCC, 77 HAv. L. REv. 701, 706

(1964).
105 See Kord, Inc., 31 F.C.C. 85, 21 P & F RADIo RE . 781 (1961).
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substantial changes in operation. 106 No prior approval by the Commission is necessary. If there were objections to such changes, they would
be considered upon renewal or assignment of the station license. To
date, however, there seems to be no effective Commission supervision
of program format changes. For example, when objections were raised
to an assignee's proposed format change, the Commission maintained
that choice of program formats is properly within the discretion of the
107
licensee.
Upon review of this decision, in Citizens Committee v. FCC
(Atlanta), s the District of Columbia Circuit censured the Commission's abdication of its duty to consider the effect of a format change on
the public interest. Numerous informal objections had been filed by
concerned citizens when the transferee of two Atlanta radio stations
proposed to change the stations' classical music format to a "blend of
popular favorites."'109 Nevertheless, the Commission granted the assignment without a hearing.110 A citizens group coalesced in an effort to
save the abandoned format and filed a petition for reconsideration
and a stay of the order granting the transfer application pending a
hearing on the question of format change. When the FCC majority
refused to grant a hearing,"' the group enlisted the aid of the appellate court. 112 The petitioners disputed the alleged financial necessity
of the format change and challenged the representativeness of the
transferee's community survey which purportedly reflected views favorable to the new format. 113 They stressed the fact that this change
involved the loss of the only classical music station in Atlanta. 114 The
court found three substantial questions of fact mandating reversal of
the Commission's order and requiring an evidentiary hearing: (1) the
106 See Amendment of Section IV (Statement of Program Service) of Broadcast Application Forms 501, 803, 314, and 315, 1 F.C.C.2d 439, 441, 5 P 9- F RADio REG. 2d 1773, 1776
(1965).
107 Glenkaren Associates, Inc., 19 F.C.C.2d 13, 15-16, 17 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 39,
42-43 (1969).
108 486 F.2d 263 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
109 Id. at 265-66.
11o Although the proposed change provoked protests to the FCC by more than 2,000

persons as well as adverse comment in a leading newspaper, id. at 265, the Commission
found that the objections raised no substantial questions requiring a hearing. Glenkaren
Associates, Inc., 14 P & F RADIo REG. 2d 104, 106 (1968).
111 Glenkaren Associates, Inc., 19 F.C.C.2d 13, 17, 17 P & F RADIo REG. 2d 39, 45
(1969). But see id. at 18-19, 17 P & F RADio REG. 2d at 45-47 (Comm'r Cox, dissenting).
112 The appeal procedure is outlined in § 402(b) of the Act. This section provides
for appeals from adverse decisions and orders of the Commission to the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Communications Act of 1934

§ 402(b), 47 U.S.C. § 402(b) (1970).
I'3 436 F.2d at 269-71.
114 rd. at 271-72.
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financial necessity of the format change; (2) the accuracy of the transferee's survey; and, (3) the availability of alternative sources of the
abandoned format." 5
The Atlanta decision spurred the FCC, in its Primer on Ascertainment of Community Problems by BroadcastApplicants,"i6 to note that
future applications involving a substantial change in program format
would be scrutinized in light of that decision. The Commission warned
that "applicants should be prepared to support their proposals to
change formats in light of the needs and tastes of the community and
'
the types of programming available from other stations."1'
Yet, despite
its apparent willingness to adopt the philosophy of Atlanta, the Commission, in subsequent cases, has exhibited a reticent attitude towards
implementing the policy of the decision. For example, the Commission
avoided intervention in subsequent challenges to proposed format
changes where the transferor had incurred substantial operating losses
under the old format rendering its continued operation economically
unfeasible."" Similarly, the Commission held that Atlanta did not control where it was found that radio stations in the area provided alternative listening sources for the abandoned format."19
In Lakewood BroadcastingService, Inc. v. FCC,20 the District of
Columbia Circuit was again called into a format change controversy.
In this case, the assignee's proposals to change a Denver station's "all
news" format to "country and western" music engendered petitions
to deny from a competing station and a citizens organization.' 2 ' This
time, however, the court affirmed what it categorized as the Commission's "painstakingly thorough decision"'122 to grant the proposed
assignment without a hearing. The petitioners alleged misrepresentation on the part of the assignee by reason of its failure to question
and include the comments of interviewees on the proposed format
change.123 In response, the court adopted the Commission's reasoning
that since ascertainment procedures only require the discovery of comat 269-72.
116 27 F.C.C.2d 650, 679-80, 21 P & F RADIO RFG. 2d 1507, 1538-39 (1971).
117 Id. at 680, 21 P & F RADIO REaG. 2d at 1539 (footnote omitted).
I18 In WCAB, Inc., 27 F.C.C.2d 743 (1971), the Commission stated that it "could not
reasonably expect the continuation of [a] format on into bankruptcy." Id. at 745. Accord,
Biola Schools and Colleges, Inc., 29 F.C.C.2d 787, 21 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 1275 (1971).
119 See Robert P. Adams, 38 F.C.C.2d 1, 25 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 805 (1972); Keyes
Corp., 31 F.C.C.2d 32, 22 P & F RADIO RaG. 2d 701 (1971).
120 478 F.2d 919 (D.C. Cir. 1978), affg Charles A. Haskell, 86 F.C.C2d 78, 25 P & F
RADIO REc. 2d 73 (1972).
121478 F.2d at 921-22.
122 d. at 922.
123 Id. at 923.
115 Id.
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munity problems, failure to solicit views regarding format preferences
did not raise substantial and material questions of fact. 24 In addition,
the court found substantial evidence in the record to support the
FCC's findings of serious financial losses under the old format 125 and
a plethora of other available news sources in the area. 26
It is clear, however, that Lakewood was not intended to be a
general judicial statement approving Commission policies. In Citizens
Committee to Keep ProgressiveRock v. FCC,127 decided the same day,
the District of Columbia Circuit criticized "[t]he Commission's failure
to recognize its obligation"'128 and reversed a Commission order granting
the application for assignment of an Ohio radio station. The licensee
sought a transfer because of years of unsuccessful operation under
"country and western" and "golden oldies" formats. 29 The assignee
proposed to change the station's format to "middle of the road"
music. 13 0 While the transfer application was still pending, the licensee
experimented with, and later, because of its overwhelming success,
permanently adopted, a "progressive rock" format.' 3 ' The assignment
was ultimately granted, and when the assignee abandoned the rock
format, a citizens committee was formed to petition for reconsideration.
The Commission majority denied the petition,132 refusing to question
the discretion of the licensee where it did not appear that the proposed
change would not serve the interests of the public. On appeal, the
court found that the absence of a showing that there were alternative
124 Ad. at 923-24. The court explained that a hearing had been required on the
accuracy of ascertainment surveys in the Atlanta case only because the transferee had
voluntarily submitted summaries of interviews with citizens regarding program preferences.
Thus the absence of any references to preference in the ascertainment survey
cannot be considered a misrepresentation. If the format change does become a
public interest issue, however, and surveys et al. are submitted by the applicant
"to support [its] proposals to change formats," misrepresentations contained
therein certainly become material.
Id. at 924 n.9. See also id. at 924-25 n.12.
125 Id. at 921-22 n.2, 924 n.11.
126 Id. at 924 n.1O.
127 478 F.2d 926 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
123 Id. at 933.
129 Id. at 927-28.
lO Id. at 928.
131 Id.
132 Twin States Broadcasting, Inc., 35 F.C.C.2d 969, 24 P 9- F RAnso REG. 2d 766
(1972). The Commission's real concern seems to have been with upsetting the assignee's
"business judgment." Id. at 971, 24 P & F RADio Rr.G. 2d at 769. Commissioner Johnson,
on the other hand, criticized the Commission's ignorance of the D.C. Circuit's mandate
in the Atlanta case "that in the face of objections to a music format change, the Commission had to hold an evidentiary hearing in order to determine whether the public
would be served by such a change." Id. at 974, 24 P & F RADio REG. 2d at 771 (Comm'r
Johnson, dissenting) (emphasis added).
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sources of the abandoned format or that its continuation was economically unfeasible created substantial questions of fact warranting a
hearing on the format change. 13 Speaking for a unanimous court,
Judge Tamm remarked that in the instant case and in Lakewood, the
court had received the "distinct impression" from the Commission's
briefs and oral arguments that
the Commission desires as limiting an interpretation [of the
Atlanta decision] as is possible.... [and] would be more than willing to limit the precedential effect of 13[that
decision] to cases involv4
ing Atlanta classical music stations.
The FCC's willingness to limit the applicability of the Atlanta
case became even more apparent in Citizens Committee to Save WEFM
v. FCC.'3 5 Although the WEFM controversy arose under facts strikingly similar to those presented in Atlanta, the Commission reached a
completely opposite conclusion through a very narrow reading of the
court's earlier holding. The assignee advised the FCC that upon being
granted the proposed transfer, it would, for purely economic reasons,
change WEFM's classical format to contemporary music. The Commission majority refused to grant a hearing on the Citizens Committee's
allegations that the transferor's financial losses were not attributable
to WEFM's classical format and that no adequate substitute for the
abandoned format was available. 136 Although the Commission's decision
was initially accepted by the District of Columbia Circuit,'13 7 upon
rehearing en banc the case was reversed and remanded for an eviden138 478 F.2d at 931-33.
134 Id. at 930.
135 506 F.2d 246 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
136 Zenith Radio Corp., 38 F.C.C.2d 838, 26 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 174 (1972). Commissioner Johnson again dissented, espousing a more liberal reading of the Atlanta
decision.
i[The mere fact that a format appeals to a majority in the community does not
insulate the format change from further scrutiny. Rather, [the Atlanta case]
demands that when a station's proposed format change will decrease the diversity of broadcast formats within a given community, the Federal Communications
Commission must determine whether that resulting decline can possibly serve
the public interest.
Id. at 850, 26 P & F RADIO REG. 2d at 187 (Comm'r Johnson, dissenting).
The Committee's petition for reconsideration was similarly denied. Zenith Radio Corp.,
40 F.C.C.2d 223, 26 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 1624 (1978). That the Atlanta decision had not
spurred the Commission to adopt any real affirmative policy toward promoting diversity
within a specialized framework is obvious from its opinion in Zenith. By and large, the
commissioners envision their role in format change controversies as a very limited one.
See id. at 230-32, 26 P & F RADIo REG. 2d at 1629-32 (additional views of Chairman Burch
in which five of the remaining six commissioners joined).
137 Citizens Comm. to Save WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d 246 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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tiary hearing.138 The court found the Committee's allegations respecting claimed losses sufficient to at least shift the burden of proof at
the hearing to the transferor, 139 the party having access to such information. Additionally, in the opinion of the court, evidence introduced
by the petitioners regarding the assignee's representations in its community survey created factual issues bearing on the question of alleged
140
misrepresentation.
Impact and Analysis
The court, in Lakewood, disavowed any intent to "set out specific
guidelines for achieving the marketplace ideal"' 4 1 in the area of radio
programming. Instead, it encouraged the Commission to adopt an affirmative policy of its own on how to balance the competing public
and private interests in format controversies. 142 In short, the court has
imposed a definite obligation on the FCC to determine whether it
would be in the public interest to abandon a format which is "unique
or otherwise serves a specialized audience that would feel its loss.'

43

In the aforementioned decisions, the court repeatedly relied upon
specific criteria in resolving the issue of whether or not an evidentiary
hearing on the issue of format changes should be ordered. 144 Two relevant considerations in this inquiry were the size of the protesting group
and the availability of alternative sources of the old format. In Atlanta,
138 Citizens Comm. to Save WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d 252 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (rehearing
en banc).
1391d. at 265-66.
1401d. at 266.
141 Lakewood Broadcasting Serv., Inc. v. FCC, 478 F.2d 919, 925 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
142 The court noted that "[t]he first, tentative steps into this complex area of regulation must be taken by the Commission." Id.
The court's role is not that of policymaker. On the contrary, it is limited by a
defined scope of review that "combines judicial supervision with a salutary principle of
judicial restraint." Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir.
1970) (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1971). In admitting the narrow scope
of its review, the court has stated: "[We defer to the expertise and experience of the
Commission within its field of specialty and would reverse only where the Commission's
position is arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable." West Mich. Telecasters, Inc. v. FCC,
396 F.2d 688, 691 (D.C. Cir. 1968). See generally L. JAFFE, JunicIAL CONTROL OF ADMINisTRATIvE AarON (1965).
143 Citizens Comm. to Save WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d 252, 262 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (rehear-

ing en banc).
144 It has been argued that the application of "guidelines" will serve to insulate the
licensee from challenges based on program format. See Citizens Comm. to Save WEFM v.
FCC, 506 F.2d 252, 278 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (rehearing en banc) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring);
Note, Developing Standards for Diversification of Broadcasting Formats, 52 TEXAS L. Ray.
562-63 (1974). It is not the guidelines themselves, however, which will overly protect the
licensee, but rather their less than diligent application by the Commission to actual
controversies.
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for example, 16 percent of the public had expressed interest in the
continuation of the abandoned format. 145 Where the community was
served by twenty broadcast frequencies, this percentage was held to
constitute a significant enough segment of the public to preclude the
FCC from finding, absent a hearing, that the proposed change was in
the public interest.146 Of course, "the fewer the radio sources the more
the tastes of the majority must be recognized."' 147 The presence and
adequacy of a listening alternative has been characterized as "undoubtedly the most important, and normally the most conclusive element"'148
for the Commission's consideration. The licensee's business judgment
may go undisturbed where the proposed change does not diminish the
diversity of programming available. Thus, in Lakewood, the news services of twenty other Denver radio stations were found to constitute
49
a sufficient alternative to the station's abandoned all news format
The economic feasibility of the abandoned format is another criterion to be considered. Bare allegations that financial considerations
necessitate the format change warrant close scrutiny by the Commission. 5° Examination of the station's financial records may reveal that
the "necessity" for the change is in actuality nothing more than a desire, on the part of the broadcaster, to realize greater profits from the
operation of the station. Commissioner Cox, dissenting in the Atlanta
145 Citizens Comm. v. FCC, 436 F.2d 263, 267 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
146 Id. at 269. See also Citizens Comm. to Keep Progressive Rock v. FCC, 478 F.2d 926
(D.C. Cir. 1973). Here, the court stated:
[N]either may the Commission ignore a minority's petitions nor should it establish a quantitative minimum. Each situation is different and should be treated
as such. Certainly the degree of support for retention of a unique format can
be of critical importance in what otherwise are "dose cases."
Id. at 929 n.7.
147 Citizens Comm. to Keep Progressive Rock v. FCC, 478 F.2d 926, 933 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
[O]ne man's Bread is the next man's Bach, Bacharach, or Buck Owens and the
Buckeroos, and where "technically and economically feasible," it is in the public's
best interest to have all segments represented.
Id. at 929 (footnote omitted). Democratic principles would seem to require, however, that
where all interests cannot be met those of the majority shall control.
148id. at 929 n.6. In Citizens Comm. to Save WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d 252 (D.C.
Cir. 1974) (rehearing en banc), the court recognized that in determining the "uniqueness"
of a particular format, the FCC will have to look beyond the broad program classification.
With respect to classical formats,
[olne station might not, for example, play music composed in this century, while
another might concentrate on twentieth century works. In popular parlance both
would be termed "classical music" stations, yet the loss of either would unquestionably lessen diversity in the area.
Id. at 264-65 n.28.
149 Lakewood Broadcasting Serv., Inc. v. FCC, 478 F.2d 919, 924 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
See also cases cited note 119 supra.
150 See Citizens Comm. v. FCC, 436 F.2d 263, 269-72 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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controversy, disputed the financial necessity for the change in that case,
maintaining that
[t]he stations were profitable, so it cannot be said that a change of
format was necessary to keep them alive. But the transferees believe
they can make more money with a popular format having broader
appeal. They probably felt they could buy a classical station for less
than they would have to pay for one more nearly serving the needs
they now seek to program for - where the refinements in format
they have made would have been less disruptive to the listening
audience. And presumably they offered the transferor more money
than he could expect from someone else who would have been
willing to continue the stations' classical programing. So the private
interests of the transferor and the transferees have been served;
only the interests of the one-sixth of the public to whom classical
music is the preferred service have suffered.16 '
The licensees' only support for their allegation was an excess of expenditures over revenues, as contained in the stations' financial re.
ports. On appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit found these figures
an unreliable index to operating profitability and remanded the case for
a hearing. 152 The court similarly remanded the Progressive Roc 153 and
WEFM'54 cases for a hearing on the economic feasibility of the change.
Despite the court's apparent delineation of the Commission's
responsibility in this area, the FCC remains committed to the principle
that the determination of entertainment program format is best left
to the business judgment of the licensee. 5 5 Adherence to this approach
has caused the Commission to construe the court's mandate in the foregoing decisions very narrowly. As the court pointed out in WEFM,
151 Glenkaren Associates, Inc., 19 F.C.C.2d 13, 19, 17 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 39, 46-47
(1969) (Comm'r Cox, dissenting).
152 Citizens Comm. v. FCC, 436 F.2d 263, 269-70 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
iSSThe question is not whether the licensee is in such dire financial straits
that an assignment should be granted, but whether the format is so economically unfeasible that an assignment encompassing a format change should be
granted.
Citizens Comm. to Keep Progressive Rock v. FCC, 478 F.2d 926, 931 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(emphasis in original).
154 Citizens Comm. to Save WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d 252, 265-66 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (rehearing en banc).
155 Adhering to the position that the determination of entertainment format is
within the purview and judgment of the licensee, the Commission has refused to act upon
objections to proposed format changes in a number of cases. See, e.g., Walter E. Webster,
Jr., 43 F.C.C.2d 300, 28 P & F RADIo REG. 2d 773 (1973); Brannen and Brannen, 42
F.C.C.2d 1020, 28 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 722 (1973); Radio Station WQFM-FM, 40 F.C.C.2d
534, 27 P & F RADIO R G. 2d 1247 (1973); Gunther Heinreich, 27 P & F RADIO R G. 2d
211 (1973); Sentinel Heights FM Broadcasters, Inc., 29 F.C.C.2d 83, 21 P & F RADIO REG.
2d 966 (1971), rev'd sub nom. Citizens Comm. to Preserve the Present Programming of
WONO(FM) v. FCC, No. 71-1336 (D.C. Cir. May 13, 1971).
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this "will only result in a continuation of this series of similar cases
that began with [the Atlanta decision] four years ago.' 56
WNCN: AR LISTENERs' REMEDIES ADEQUATE

IN MIDsTREAM

FORMAT CHANGES?

The Commission's policy has even more serious implications in
the event that a format change does not occur in conjunction with the
transfer or renewal of a station license. While the majority of format
changes have occurred in the context of an assignment situation, a
licensee may alter its programming format during the license term.
Although the licensee is expected to advise the Commission at the
time a change is made, the wisdom of the licensee's decision goes unchallenged until the station license comes up for renewal. Having
assumed that such business judgment of a licensee is beyond its scrutiny, the Commission has failed to devise any procedures for consideration of a change in operation during the license period.
The most recent example of such a midstream format change is
the controversy involving the New York radio station WNCN. 1r7 Starr
Broadcasting Group, Inc., the licensee, acquired WNCN by transfer
in 1970, at which time it represented that it would continue the established classical format.158 In August of 1974, it was announced that the
station's format would be changed to progressive rock on October 5,
1974.159 A listeners group was immediately organized to oppose the
change of this allegedly unique format. The group petitioned for revocation of the license or, in the alternative, for early submission of
Starr's renewal application and, pending a full evidentiary hearing,
other special relief including a stay of the format change.1 0 Fearful
that midstream intervention would constitute a form of censorship,
the Commission refused "to depart from the basic principle of licensee
responsibility" and to consider the format change prior to the expiration of the normal licensing period.' 6' On appeal from this decision,
the District of Columbia Circuit denied the petitioners' request for ex156 Citizens Comm. to Save WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d 252, 267 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (rehearing en banc).
157 News about the WNCN format change provoked adverse commentary in a leading
New York magazine. See Rich, Mr. Buckley Passes the Buck, NEW YORK, Sept. 23, 1974,
at 78. The retort offered by the chairman of the board of the licensee company may be
found in Buckley, Buckley (Politely) Returns the Hand Grenade, NEw YoRK, Oct. 7,
1974, at 54.
158 See Brief for Petitioner at 2-3, Starr WNCN, Inc., 48 F.C.C.2d 1221, 31 P & F
RADIO REG. 2d 648 (1974).
159 See Starr WNCN, Inc., 48 F.C.C.2d 1221, 31 P & F RADIo R G. 2d 648 (1974).
160 See id.
161 Id., 31 P & F RADIO REG. 2d at 649.
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traordinary relief because it "would constitute judicial intervention at
16 2
a time when the deliberations of the agency are far from complete."'
Having been denied the right to intervene at this stage, 6 3 the listeners
have been relegated to pursue inadequate and insufficient remedies.
Petitions to Deny
A number of factors illustrate the inefficiency of relegating public
intervention to the renewal stage. Renewal proceedings very often
extend over a period of years. It is unlikely that a publicly supported
group which has petitioned to deny the renewal of a station license
will be able to remain financially viable during such protracted litigation. If the change being contested occurs in midstream, moreover,
the protesting group is forced to wait the remainder of the three-year
license term 64 before any relief is even considered. A delay of even
a few months could mean the permanent loss of station personnel and
a valuable record library.61 In addition, denial of renewal has occurred
only in exceptional cases. 166 Therefore, even if the group does survive
162 WNCN Listeners' Guild v. FCC, No. 74-1925, at 2 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 25, 1974).
163 The FCC deferred consideration until "the entire matter is before the Commission
in a proper posture," Starr WNCN, Inc., 48 F.C.C.2d 1221, 1222, 81 P & F RAnio REG. 2d

648, 649 (1974), presumably until the licensee sought either to assign or to renew its
station license.
164 Broadcasters have repeatedly attempted to extend this period to five years instead
of three. Eleven bills to that effect were introduced into the 92d Congress. See BROADCASrING, Aug. 16, 1971, at 13, citing S. 663, H.R. 510, 594, 5242, 7862, 7900, 7901, 8522,
8927, 9153, 9652, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1971). Similar legislative proposals were introduced
in 1973. See Goldberg, A Proposal to Deregulate Broadcast Programming, 42 Gao. WASH.
L. RFv. 73 (1973); Kramer, An Argument for Maintaining the Current FCC Controls, 42
GEo. WAiH. L. REv. 93 (1978); Note, FCC Broadcast License Renewal Reform: Two Comments on Recent Legislative Proposals, 42 GEo. WAsH. L. REV. 67 (1978). Much of the
blame for the death of such legislation during the 93d Congress was attributed to the
failure of the House Commerce Committee's chairman, Harley Staggers, to appoint conferees. See BROADCASTING, Dec. 16, 1974, at 19. As many as 50 license renewal bills have
thus far been introduced into the 94th Congress, nearly all of which provide for the
lengthening of the renewal period from three to four or five years. See BROADCASTING,
July 7, 1975, at 18.
165 In WNCN, the listeners unsuccessfully argued before both the Commission and
the court that a stay of the proposed format change was necessary to prevent irreparable injury to the public. Should the classical music format be restored at a later date,
the Guild argued, a record library valued at $750,000, the station's classical music staff,
and much of its audience would have been lost in the interim. Brief for Petitioner at 14,
Starr WNCN, Inc., 48 F.C.C.2d 1221, 31 P & F RADIo RFG. 2d 648 (1974).
166 It took two decisions of the D.C. Circuit to deny renewal of WLBT's license in
the Church of Christ case. See Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ
v. FCC, 425 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1969). From a 1969 case study of broadcast license renewals in New York and New Jersey, Commissioners Cox and Johnson concluded that a
number of the FCC's decisions left them "with the uncomfortable sensation that no
programing proposal, however irresponsible or frivolous, could lead the majority to deny
a license renewal." Renewal of Radio and Television Licenses in New York and New
Jersey, 18 F.C.C.2d 268, 269 (1969) (separate statement of Comm'rs Cox and Johnson).
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the pendency of the action, the odds against its ultimate success are
great.
Should a broadcaster who has instituted a format change subsequently seek to transfer his station's license, the petition to deny may
again prove to be an ineffective tool for the purposes of restoring an
abandoned format. In some instances, the filing of a petition to deny
causes such delay in the FCC's consideration of the transfer application
that the contract for sale expires before approval. 16 7 If it is unable to
renegotiate, the licensee will be forced to withdraw its transfer application leaving its new format to go unchallenged until renewal. 168
PrivateAgreements
While the FCC has never denied a renewal or transfer application
on the basis of the proposed entertainment format, either the designation of an application for a hearing, or a challenger's mere filing of a
petition to deny, with the concomitant prospects of costly and timeconsuming proceedings, often induces the parties to settle the controversy by means of a private contractual agreement. 169 For example, in
Progressive Rock the litigants settled the dispute prior to the ordered
evidentiary hearing. In that case, the citizens group agreed to withdraw
its objections to the transfer in exchange for the assignee's promise to
reevaluate the format change in the event that the other progressive
The situation had not improved by 1973. See Renewals of Broadcast Licenses for Ark.,

La., & Miss., 42 F.C.C.2d 1, 6 (1973) (Comm'r Johnson, dissenting).

With respect to license renewal challenges by competitive applicants, the FCC had
previously taken the position that substantial performance by an incumbent licensee
would entitle it to automatic renewal. See Policy Statement Concerning Comparative
Hearings Involving Regular Renewal Applicants, 22 F.C.C.2d 424, 425, 18 P & F RADIO REG.
2d 1901, 1904 (1970). This policy, however, was quickly disapproved by the court in
Citizens Communication Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201, 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1971), and thereafter declared null and void. Citizens Communication Center v. FCC, 463 F.2d 822, 823
(D.C. Cir. 1972) (per curiam). Still, the FCC has decided against the incumbent in a
comparative renewal situation only once in the history of broadcasting. JENNINGS, supra
note 17, at 15, citing Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 463 F.2d 268 (D.C. Cir.

1971).

167 See KNOK Broadcasting, Inc., 29 F.C.C.2d 47, 21 P & F RADIo REG. 2d 960 (1971).
The petitioner in this case had previously petitioned to deny the proposed transfer of
station KKDA. Because of its inability to negotiate an extension of time under the
contract of sale, the licensee had to request that the Commission dismiss its transfer
application. Id. at 47-48.
168 See id. When the KNOK licensee itself changed the format, the petitioner brought
the instant action requesting the institution of revocation proceedings, or, in the alternative, immediate submission of KKDA's application for renewal. The Commission denied
both requests. Id. at 52.
169 For a discussion of the utility of such agreements in solving the dilemma ot
format changes see Note, Developing Standards for Diversification of Broadcasting
Formats, 52 TExAs L. Rav. 558 (1974).
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rock station in the area ceased to provide an adequate alternate
170
source.
Similarly, the parties in the WNCN controversy' 7 ' have resorted to private agreement. Intimidated by the filing of petitions
to deny the station's renewal by two listeners groups and a competing
application by Concert Radio, Inc., Starr Broadcasting has reluctantly
agreed to sell the FM station to GAF Corp. 7 2 The five-party agreement

envisions withdrawal of the petitions to deny and the competing application in return for certain concessions. The station's classical music
format has been restored and Starr will continue to operate the station
until the transfer to GAF is approved by the FCC. GAF, in turn,
has pledged to provide for a listener's voice in the station's management and to give Concert Radio a five-year option to buy the station
in the event GAF should want to sell or change the classical format
at a later date. The deal also looks to the reimbursement of 75 percent
of the legal expenses- an amount in excess of $100,000- incurred
by the three withdrawing groups during the year long controversy. It
should be noted, however, that private agreement among the parties
does not always mean final resolution of the controversy since such
agreements are always subject to Commission approval, and any provision which might curtail the ultimate discretion of the licensee will
not be given effect. 178 The entire WNCN agreement as well as the
transfer of the station, therefore, must ultimately pass Commission
scrutiny.
A

PROPOSED SOLUTION

In his concurring opinion in WEFM, Chief Judge Bazelon of the
District of Columbia Circuit challenged the majority's broad view of
the Commission's authority, urging consideration of the first amend170 The original agreement required the assignee to reinstate the abandoned format
if 20% of the public were found to favor progressive rock. This agreement was rejected
by the FCC, Twin States Broadcasting, Inc., 42 F.C.C.2d 1091, 28 P & F RADIO REG. 2d
145 (1973), but a modified agreement giving the licensee the ultimate discretion with
respect to the format change was later approved. Twin States Broadcasting, Inc., 29
P & F RADIO REG. 2d 490 (1973).
171 See text accompanying notes 157-63 supra.
172 See BROADCASTING, Aug. 25, 1975, at 62; Vidal, CongratulationsPour in to Station
WNCN, N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1975, at 41, col. 4.
173 The Commission has prefaced its approval of private agreements in a number
of cases with the reminder that the ultimate responsibility in programming matters must
lie with the licensee. See, e.g., Public Communications, Inc., 31 P & F RADIO R G. 2d 714
(1974); Democratic Party, 37 F.C.C.2d 526, 25 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 376 (1972); Bob Jones
Univ., Inc., 32 F.C.C.2d 781, 23 P & F RADIO RAG. 2d 410 (1971).
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ment implications of its decision.17 4 Disturbed that "the whole gamut of
FCC programming policies have [sic] developed over the last forty
years . . . in a manner obdurately resistant to First Amendment

values,"'175 Judge Bazelon suggested that consideration of a format
change should only take place within the context of a comparative
licensing proceeding. 17 6 The first amendment value of diversity of ideas,
he believed, could not support consideration of content in a noncomparative situation; but "[w]hen faced with mutually exclusive applicants for the same frequency the FCC is in a position where it must by
77
the nature of the proceeding choose among speakers."'
Admittedly, accommodation of the first amendment values involved requires a delicate balancing approach with respect to any intrusion into the area of programming content. It must be remembered,
however, that the primary duty of both the station licensee and the
Commission is to serve the general public. A narrow interpretation
of the Commission's authority in this area, such as the one suggested
by Chief Judge Bazelon, would give free reign to the licensee's discretion during the license term. This approach would seem to undermine
the very purpose of the public interest mandate and would further
seriously threaten the future effectiveness of listener participation in
programming -unquestionably, the area of the public's greatest concern.

Under the authority of the public interest mandate, the Commission could require a broadcaster who had made the decision to depart
from the established entertainment format to submit a program preference survey similar to the ascertainment survey presently required with
respect to community problems. 78 As it is now, before granting an initial application or an application for renewal of a station license, the
Commission must find that the applicant's programming, as represented in its application form, would be in the public interest. If subsequent to the grant, the licensee or its assignee wishes to depart from
these representations, it is submitted that it be required to demonstrate
that any substituted performance would similarly be in the public interest. Such a procedure would forewarn the broadcaster of potential
opposition to the change, if undertaken, and further promote broadcaster responsiveness to the community.
174 Citizens Comm. to Save WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d 252, 269-70 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (rehearing en banc) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring).
175 Id. at 270.
176d. at 278-81.

177 Id. at 279 (footnote omitted).
178 See notes 79-80 and accompanying text supra.
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Should the licensee, either undaunted or encouraged by the results
of its survey, elect to pursue the format change, a swifter and more
efficient method for concerned citizens to voice their opposition is
necessary. Under the Commission's present approach, the licensee is only
answerable for such a change upon a subsequent application for renewal of the station license. A solution most favorable to the listeners
would be the adoption by the Commission of a new procedure allowing
for immediate public intervention and FCC consideration of the
format change issue during the license term. The institution of a whole
new procedural remedy, however, would unnecessarily increase the
17 9
workload of an already overburdened agency.

A more reasoned solution would be to permit members of the
listening public to file a petition for early submission of the license
renewal application. 8 0 Since a station license is granted on the basis
of specific representations of performance, it does not seem unreasonable that a broadcaster should not be permitted to substantially alter
the station's operation without a preliminary determination by the
Commission that such a change would be in the public interest. If the
allegations of the petitioner raise substantial and material questions of
fact regarding the format change, the Commission could then consider
the propriety of the change in the context of this early comparative
renewal proceeding where it would be required to determine whether
a licensee's continued operation is in the public interest. Assuming that
the format change was proposed in good faith, it would not occur r.t
the
beginning of the license period. Therefore, early submission of a renewal application would entail only a minor inconvenience to the
licensee and the Commission since consideration of the change would
have to take place within a relatively short period of time anyway. At
the same time, it would prevent irreparable injury to the public which
could be caused by a delay of even a few months.' 8 '
The Commission fears that any restriction on the exercise of discretion by the licensee in this area would in effect "lock" the broadcaster into a particular format and discourage experimentation with
179 For an interesting account of the daily workload of the Commission see Johnson
8- Dystel, A Day in the Life: The Federal Communications Commission, 82 YALE L.J. 1575
(1973).
180 In view of the fact that the Commission is "particularly reluctant to use a revocation proceeding to intrude into the area of a licensee's programming judgments," Radio
Para La Raza, 40 F.C.C.2d 1102, 1106, 27 P & F RADIo Ro. 2d 836, 842 (1973), an early
renewal proceeding would be a more appropriate procedural context for consideration
of the format change.
181 See note 165 and accompanying text supra.
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new types of programming.8 2 The institution of procedures such as
those outlined above, however, would not prevent a broadcaster from
changing its format, but merely insure that any change in the licensee's
performance was in the public interest. In some instances where, for
example, other stations in the area provide adequate listening alternatives, or the continuation of a particular format would be economically
unfeasible, a format change generally would be warranted. On the
other hand, a licensee's profit motives should not be permitted to prevail at the expense of the listening pleasure and, in many cases, the
cultural enrichment of the public.1 s3 Insofar as the public is concerned,
when a station alters its format, a whole new station has come into
being. The fact that the ownership remains the same is of no consequence to the listener who is faced with all new radio programming
and station personnel. Just as the Commission readily accepts its duty
to determine whether a change in ownership would be in the public
interest, it should not be permitted to shirk its responsibility to make
a public interest determination with respect to format changes.
CONCLUSION

Admittedly, "any government effort to regulate the content of programming must be carefully scrutinized for possible interference with
free expression."' 8 4 Yet, a laissez-faire attitude towards programming
has proven ineffective to promote diversity and first amendment interests of the public. 8 5 The Commission's traditional approach of nonintervention in the area of entertainment programming is not only
unresponsive to recent developments in the broadcasting industry, but
also inconsistent with its own policy with respect to other types of programming. In attempting to balance the respective interests of the
licensee and the listening public, the FCC has imposed reasonable
restrictions on the former's freedom of choice in news and public
affairs programming. 8 6 In the area of entertainment, however, it
182 See Twin States Broadcasting, Inc., 35 F.C.C.2d 969, 971, 24 P & F RADIo RE. 2d
766, 769 (1972).
183 In some cases the facts surrounding the format change have suggested that the
licensee has bought an unprofitable, though culturally valuable, radio station with the
intention of subsequently converting its format to a more profitable and popular one. In
this regard, see Commissioner Cox's analysis of the licensee's motives for the format
change in the Atlanta case set forth in the text accompanying note 151 supra. Starr
Broadcasting Co., the licensee in the WNCN case, has allegedly made switches of this
type with three other radio stations. See Rich, Mr. Buckley Passes the Buck, NEw Yout,
Sept. 23, (1974), at 78.
184 Citizens Comm. to Save WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d 246, 251 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
185 See notes 108-40 and accompanying text supra.
186 See, e.g., City of Camden, 18 F.C.C.2d 412, 16 P & F RADIo REG. 2d 555 (1969).
The Commission denied the assignment application in this case where the assignee pro-
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refuses to restrict the licensee's discretion beyond the requirement that
it give notice of a format change.18 7 There is no sound reason for this
distinction. The broadcaster's first amendment rights, the Commission's
chief justification for nonintervention, "would, if anything, indicate
a lesser - not a greater - governmental role in matters affecting news,
public affairs, and religious programming."' 88 Entertainment programming is more a business venture for the broadcaster than a vehicle for
self-expression. While profit motives are not to be ignored, they cannot
be permitted to govern the licensee's judgment exclusively because
broadcasting, unlike most other business enterprises, is engulfed with
the public interest.
The Commission has expressed concern that requiring it to
examine entertainment program content would be tantamount to
making it a "national arbiter of taste."'1 9 As noted in the Atlanta decision, "[t]he Commission is not dictating tastes when it seeks to discover
what they presently are, and then to consider what assignment of channels is feasible and fair in terms of their gratification."', 0 Requiring
the licensee to ascertain community program preferences will help to
insure that both the broadcaster and the Commission remain attuned
to the programming tastes of the general public. Diligent application
of the content-neutral guidelines1 91 suggested by the District of Columbia Circuit in its recent decisions will enable the Commission to determine how these interests should be met and settle future program
format controversies in a manner which is consistent with both the
public interest mandate of the Communications Act and the first
amendment.
Joanne Welty
posed "substantial reductions in news, public affairs, other nonentertainment and ethnicoriented programing." Id. at 418, 16 P & F RADIO REG. 2d at 564. The different approach
taken with respect to news and public affairs programming is evident from the Commission's opinion.
When an applicant proposes to reduce the news, public affairs, and other nonentertainment programing presently received by a broadcast facility's audience,
it must come forward with some strong and substantial showing that these reductions will not harm, but rather accord with the public interest. Listeners and
viewers may come to depend upon, and even plan their lives around, the programing offered by broadcast facilities.
Id. at 423, 16 P & F RAro REG. 2d at 571. See also text accompanying notes 79-88 supra.
187 See text accompanying notes 98-99 supra.
188 Citizens Comm. to Save WEFM v. FCC, .506 F.2d 252, 267 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (rehearing en banc).
189 Citizens Comm. v. FCC, 436 F.2d 263, 272 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
190 Id.

191 For a discussion of the specific criteria the court considered relevant to the
question of format changes see notes 144-54 and accompanying text supra.

